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Cheers rippled through the crowd as an announcement echoed
from the public address system during a track meet at a mid-Michigan
high school. In metro-Detroit, players slapped hands during a tennis
match. At a girls' high school soccer game on the other side of the
state, players and parents celebrated as well.1 However, the cheers
were not for a high school state championship, or even for the Detroit
Pistons or Redwings latest playoff victory; rather, these were cheers
for the U.S. Supreme Court. On May 2, 2005, the Supreme Court
announced a decision assuring that the current scheduling of high
school sports seasons would remain unchanged for at least another
2
school year.
Yet, as in a sporting event, where one play can quickly swing
momentum the opposite way, one court ruling can cause an equal
reverse of fortunes. Such was the story for the Michigan High School
Athletic Association (MHSAA); by the summer of 2006, the prospects
of the MHSAA retaining its current scheduling of "nontraditional"
sports seasons seemed about as likely as a Chicago Cubs World Series
victory. 3 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' August 16, 2006 ruling
virtually guaranteed that Michigan must move its girls' basketball
and volleyball seasons, which are currently played in the fall and

1.

Press Release, Michigan High School Athletic Association, An MHSAA

Commentary By Communications Director John Johnson: Hearing The Cheers (May 13,
2005), available at http://www.mhsaa.com/news/05jjcommentary.htm.
2.
Id. See Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Cmtys. for Equity, 544 U.S. 1012
(2005). The current scheduling of girls' sports seasons at issue are volleyball in the winter,
basketball in the fall, soccer in the spring, Lower Peninsula golf in the spring, Lower
Peninsula swimming and diving in the fall, and tennis in the fall. Cmtys. for Equity v.
Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 807 (W.D. Mich. 2001). All of these
girls' sports (with the exception of girls' golf) are played in a nontraditional season, i.e., a
season of the year different from when the sport is typically played. Id.
3.
At 98 years, the Chicago Cubs currently have the longest championship drought
of any major professional sports team. They have not won a World Series since 1908.
Wikipedia.org, List of Major League Baseball Franchise Post-Season Droughts,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of_MajorLeague-Baseballfranchise-postseason-droughts (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).

2007]

CHANGING SEASONS, CHANGING TIMES

winter respectively, to be played in the traditional 4 seasons with
5
volleyball in the fall and basketball in the winter.
In many respects, the MHSAA was fighting a losing battle from
the start
Similar cases brought in other states involving
nontraditional seasons for girls' athletics have been almost exclusively
decided in favor of the female athletes. 6 Currently, Michigan remains
7
the only state to maintain nontraditional seasons for girls' volleyball
and one of only two states to schedule girls' basketball outside of the
traditional winter season.8 Within the last several years, the high
school athletic associations in West Virginia, Virginia, Montana,
Arizona, and South Dakota have all changed their girls' sports seasons
as a direct result of actual or potential lawsuits by female athletes. 9
Although Title IX is applicable at the elementary and
secondary levels, most litigation traditionally has focused on violations
of the Act at the collegiate level. 10 Thus, while collegiate athletics
programs have made important strides in achieving gender equality, it
4.
A "traditional" season in Title IX litigation is the season when the sport is
usually played at most levels. The court in MHSAA states, "for most sports, it is common
knowledge when tradition dictates that a sport will be played." Mich. High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808 (W.D. Mich. 2001). For example, even those who are not
sports fans would know that football is traditionally a fall sport. However, the courts in
Title IX litigation only "caref about traditional sports seasons to the extent that the
traditional season [is] the most advantageous season" for the sport to be played. Id. at 808.
5.
See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 459 F.3d 676 (6th Cir.
2006) (affirming on remand the district court holding that MHSAA's actions violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), vacated, 544 U.S. 1012 (2002).
6.
See, e.g., McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 299 (2d Cir.
2004) (finding that the disparity in treatment arising from scheduling girls' high school
soccer in the spring and boys' high school soccer in the fall, which deprives girls but not
boys the opportunity to compete in the New York State Championships in soccer, violates
Title IX); Lambert v. West Va. State Bd. of Educ., 447 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1994) (holding
that scheduling of girls' high school basketball season outside the traditionally observed
official winter season was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the West
Virginia Constitution).
7.
Hope Yen, High Court Asks 6th Circuit to Reconsider Girls Sports Season
Ruling, LAW.COM, May 3, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l115037320291.
8.
Id. Hawaii, which holds its girls' high school basketball state championship in
the spring season, is the only other state to sanction girls' basketball in a nontraditional
season. See Hawaii High School Athletic Association, Tournament Information,
http://www.sportshigh.com/page-server//Sports/Basketball-Girls/Tournament/D35269
A9B454EA3F20020616205213214464000000.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007) (noting that
the girls' division basketball tournament takes place in May).
9.
Allison Steele, Michigan Key Test for Girls' Sports, WOMEN'S ENEWS, Oct. 2,
2001, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/669/context/archive.
10.
See Ray Yasser & Samuel J. Schiller, Gender Equity in Athletics: The New
Battleground of Interscholastic Sports, 15 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 371, 371 (1997)
(stating that "[u]ntil now, Title IX has had its most profound impact on intercollegiate
athletics" but that "a new battleground has emerged on the high school and middle school
levels").
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is widely believed that there remains "broad-based discrimination
against female athletes at the lower levels of education."" This note
focuses on the recent trend towards federal court enforcement of Title
IX provisions at the interscholastic level. As illustrated through the
landmark court case Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School
Athletic Association, this note suggests that the Sixth Circuit's broad
interpretation of the scope of discrimination claims, coupled with an
excessively high standard of scrutiny for athletic association policies,
could have a chilling effect on girls' sports and ultimately lead to
12
decreased participation levels nationwide.
Part I addresses the historical and legal significance of Title IX
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
applied to female athletics. Part II then provides an overview of the
landmark litigation in the continuing legal saga of Communities for
Equity v. MHSAA, detailing the claims presented by the plaintiffs and
the defenses offered by the MHSAA in justification of its policy. Part
III then examines the recent trend of Title IX litigation in federal
courts in light of this most recent Sixth Circuit ruling. After almost
ten years of litigation, the combination of holdings in the Communities
for Equity cases have led to both an excessively high standard of
scrutiny and an overly broad applicability that ultimately may
negatively impact girls' sports by decreasing female participation-the
very goal Title IX seeks to ensure. Finally, Part IV addresses the
immediate implications of the lawsuit and the possible options that
remain for the MHSAA in response to the most recent ruling.

11.
Neena Chaudhry & Marcia Greenberger, Seasons of Change: Communities for
Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 8 (2003).
See also Jessica McRorie, Parents Sue to Level High School Playing Fields, WOMEN'S
ENEWS, Aug. 24, 2001, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/629.
"Unlike
colleges and universities, which must adhere to the 1994 Equity Disclosure Act, high
schools are not required to publish information on their athletic participation, staffing,
revenues or expenses." Id. This lack of reporting results in little governmental scrutiny
allowing most high-school level discriminatory practices to go "unchecked... until someone
files a lawsuit or states pass their own statutes." Id.
12.
See Bob Becker, Ruling Thursday Could Change Girls Sports Landscape:
DistrictJudge to Decide on MHSAA Scheduling Plan, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July 31, 2002,
at El, available at 2002 WLNR 11942312.
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I. THE FIGHT AGAINST GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN INTERSCHOLASTIC
SPORTS: TITLE IX AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

A. Title IX and Creating Gender Equity in Athletics

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of gender by educational institutions
receiving federal financial assistance. 13 With some exceptions, Section
901(a) provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 14 The amendment
was enacted in response to evidence demonstrating massive and
pervasive patterns of discrimination against women with regard to
educational opportunities. 15 Despite legislative efforts to limit the
effect of Title IX on athletics, 16 the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) 17 published regulations that specifically addressed
the statute's requirements in the athletic programs of educational
institutions.' 8 Specifically, Section 106.41(c) requires equal athletic
opportunity for both sexes in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club
or intramural athletic programs. 19
Since the enactment of Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, female participation in athletics at both the high school and
collegiate level has increased dramatically. 20 In 1971, prior to the

13.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
14.
Id. The exceptions to Title IX are not applicable to the sports seasons cases and
therefore will not be discussed in this note.
15.
McCormick, v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 286 (2d Cir. 2004); see
also DiscriminationAgainst Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the
Special Subcommitteee on Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 91st Cong.
(1970); 118 CONG. REC. 5804 n.11 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
16.
These efforts included a proposed amendment to the Act, introduced by Senator
John Tower in 1974, which would have exempted "revenue producing" intercollegiate
sports from Title IX's coverage. McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287.
17.
In 1979 HEW was split into the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and the Department of Education (ED). See U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Historical Highlights,at http://www.hhs.gov/about/hhshist.html. "All educational
functions were transferred to ED, and thus . . . [it is] the administrative agency charged
with administering Title IX." McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287 (citations omitted).
18.
See 45 C.F.R. § 86 (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 106.
19.
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (providing that any recipient of federal funds that
operates or sponsors "interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall
provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes").
20.
See Greg Garber, ESPN.COM, Landmark Law Faces New ChallengesEven Now,
June 22,
2006, http://espn.go.com/gen/womenandsports/020619title9.html;
National
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amendment, approximately 300,000 girls played competitive high

school sports nationwide. 21 In the 2005-2006 school year, the
participation level of high school girls had increased to nearly three
The number of female athletes participating in
million. 22
intercollegiate sports in the thirty year time span since Title IX's
enactment has also grown significantly. In 1971 there were roughly
30,000 female college athletes; today there are more than 23150,000, and
the number of women's college teams has nearly doubled.
While the scope of Title IX extends to the athletic department
of any school district that receives federal funding, the majority of
Title IX litigation has focused on intercollegiate athletics. 24 Despite
the statistics demonstrating participation increases, equity in
athletics remains an issue even at the collegiate level where most
litigation has occurred. 25 Although high schools and middle schools
are covered by the Act, relatively few cases have been tried under Title
IX at those levels. 26 This general lack of enforcement at the lower
educational levels has arguably resulted in the continuation of
pervasive broad-based discrimination against female athletes at the
interscholastic level.2 7 For example, in Georgia, an Atlanta newspaper

Federation of State High School Associations, 2005-2006 NFHS Participation Survey,
http://www.nfhs.org/core/contentmanager/uploads/2005-06NFHSparticipationsurvey.pdf

(last visited Mar. 20, 2007) [hereinafter NFHS Survey].
21.

NFHS Survey, supra note 20.

22.

Id.

23.
Garber, supra note 20.
24.
See, e.g., Favla v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); State Bd. of
Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993);
Roberts v. Colo. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
At the collegiate level resources for women's athletics programs continue to lag
25.
behind men's: although women constitute over 53% of the student body at Division 1
colleges, they are only 41% of the athletes, get only 32% of the recruiting dollars, and
receive only 36% of the overall athletic operating budgets. National Women's Law Center,
http://www.aahperd.org/NAGWS/titleix/pdf/
IX
&
Athletics,
Title
Facts
on
NWLCTitleIXFacts.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
In 1988 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Restoration Act which reinstated an
26.
institution-wide application of Title IX. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2000). Under the Act, if any
part of an educational institution receives federal funds, the institution as a whole must
comply with Title IX's provisions. See id.; see also McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck,
370 F.3d 275, 287 (2d Cir. 2004); Yasser & Schiller, supra note 10, at 371-72.
Chaudhry & Greenberger, supra note 11, at 8. Part of the reason for this lack of
27.
enforcement is due to the fact that data on gender equity in athletics at the elementary and
secondary levels is not readily available. The Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA)
which requires federally funded coeducational higher education institutions with
intercollegiate varsity sports to report certain gender equity information (e.g. sports teams
and participation by gender, athletic scholarship dollars awarded to male and female
athletes, and revenues and expenses for men's and women's teams) is not applicable to
interscholastic level programs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g) (2000).
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series stated that gender inequities in sports continue with only 36
percent of girls playing competitive sports in the state, as opposed to
64 percent of boys. 28 Furthermore, the paper showed that 86 percent
of all legislative grants for athletic related purposes went to projects
where boys' sports were the main beneficiaries. 29 Similarly, in
Duquesne, Pennsylvania, "for every dollar the school board spent on
sports, girls' sports received only a dime." 30 Thus, the decision in
Communities for Equity v. MHSAA will have a profound impact in
addressing this new battleground of Title IX litigation-gender
discrimination in interscholastic sports.
B. Equal Protection Clause: Gender Classificationsand Heightened
Scrutiny
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." 3 1 A person may state a claim under Title 42 of the U.S. Code,
Section 1983, if that person alleges the defendant deprived him or her
of a constitutional right while acting "under color" of state law. 32 The
Supreme Court has held that high school athletic associations are
state actors and thus subject to Equal Protection Clause
33
requirements.
Further, the Equal Protection Clause is violated only when
there is intentional discrimination. 34 Thus, the key issue is the

28.

Chaudhry & Greenberger, supra note 11, at 8 (citing Mike Fish & David A.

Milliron, Special Report: Eight-Day Series, The Gender Gap, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 12,

1999).
Id.
29.
30.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, in order to be liable under Section 1983 for
32.
violating the Fourteenth Amendment, a defendant must be considered a "state actor." See
e.g., LRL Props. v. Portage Metro Hous. Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1111 (6th Cir. 1995) ("To state
a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a [Section] 1983 plaintiff must allege that a
state actor intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of membership in a
protected class." (quoting Henry v. Metro. Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990));
Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 845 (W.D. Mich.
2001).
33.
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 291
(2001) (holding the TSSAA's regulatory activity constituted a state action because of the
"pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the structure of the association.")
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (purposeful discrimination is an
34.
essential element of an equal protection violation); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140,
144 n.3 (1979) (requirements for establishing a Section 1983 claim are the same as those
for establishing the underlying constitutional or statutory violations); Int'l Brotherhood of
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defendant's intent 35 ; the plaintiffs must show that disadvantages are
imposed because of, not merely in spite of, race or gender. 36 Since
gender is a protected class, any policy that facially uses gender as a
classification will trigger a presumption of discriminatory intent and a
37
heightened level of scrutiny from the court.
Once a gender classification has been established, the burden
then falls on the defendant to justify the differential treatment. 38 A
law that discriminates on its face will trigger heightened scrutiny
from the court; therefore the State's justification for the classification
must be "exceedingly persuasive." 39 In evaluating the challenged
classification, the courts look to whether the discriminatory
classification serves "important governmental objectives" and uses
means that are "substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." 40
Significantly, no showing of animus or intentional

Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (stating that "proof of
discriminatory motive is critical" to prevailing in a disparate treatment action).
35.
See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.115 (explaining that civil rights laws recognize
two theories of discrimination: (1) disparate treatment-intentional discrimination based
upon one's membership in a protected class (e.g., race, gender); (2) disparate impactdiscrimination that results from the application of a rule that is facially neutral but has
discriminatory effects). Here, plaintiffs' claims are disparate treatment only; they are
challenging the MHSAA's intentional differential treatment of girls, not some facially
neutral rule that has the effect of harming girls. Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 848.
36.
Intentional discrimination means only an intent to treat girls and boys
differently, not to purposely disadvantage girls-under the disparate treatment theory there
is no harmful motive requirement. Cmtys. for Equity, 459 F.3d at 694. See also United
States v. Virginia (VMJ), 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996); Pederson v. Lousiana State
University, 213 F.3d 858, 881 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying same test to Title IX violations
"[The university] need not have intended to violate Title IX, but need only have intended to
treat women differently").
37.
See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (using heightened
scrutiny to "smoke out' illegitimate uses" of race and to ensure that classifications are not
the product of racial prejudice or stereotype and noting that classifications based on race or
gender require a "close examination" of legislative purposes); Pers. Adm'r v. Feeny, 442
U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (finding that facially discriminatory laws that divide persons based on
race necessitate heightened scrutiny because "certain classifications ... in themselves
supply reason to infer antipathy"). "Without equating gender classifications, for all
purposes, to classifications based on race or national origin," when focusing on differential
treatment or denial of opportunity, there is "a strong presumption that gender
classifications are invalid." V1MI, 518 U.S. at 532-33. See also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S.
420, 444 (1998) (finding there is a "strong presumption that gender-based legal distinctions
are suspect"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying a heightened level of
scrutiny, sometimes called "intermediate scrutiny," to statutory classifications that
distinguish between males and females).
38.
Cmtys. for Equity, v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 848
(W.D. Mich. 2001).
39.
VMI, 518 U.S. at 532.
40.
Id. at 533. The Court stated:
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discrimination is required when the defendant's classification is
41
discriminatory on its face.
II. FIGHTING THE SEASONAL TREND: COMMUNITIES FOR EQUITY V.
MICHIGAN HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION

A. Overview: The Beginnings of an Epic Battle
In June 1998, an organization of parents known as
Communities for Equity (CFE), 42 in conjunction with two mothers of
female student athletes, filed a federal class action lawsuit against the
Claiming that the
MHSAA alleging gender discrimination. 43
nontraditional scheduling of girls' high school sports in the state of
Michigan disadvantaged their daughters, the parents alleged
violations of Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act
(ELCRA). 44 Specifically, they claimed that the MHSAA "schedules
athletics seasons and tournaments for six girls' sports during less
advantageous times of the academic year than boys' athletic seasons
and tournaments, and that this scheduling ...constitutes inequitable
treatment." 45 In December of 2001, the district court held that the
current scheduling of athletic seasons by the MHSAA violated the
[A] State must show at least that the [challenged] classification serves important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. The justification
must be genuine . . . [a]nd it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about
the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.
Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 848-49.
41.
CFE is a nonprofit organization founded by parent Diane Madsen in 1997. The
42.
organization consists of parents, students, athletes, coaches and others with a goal "to
educate people about the compliance of Title IX, about gender equity in general in
athletics, and to advocate for the compliance of Title IX." http://cfe.org.
See Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805.
43.
In the original lawsuit, plaintiffs charged that the MHSAA discriminated by
44.
chilling girls' participation opportunities by scheduling too few state tournaments for girls'
sports. Chaundry & Greenberger, supra note 11, at 13-14, nn.55-60 (citing CFE's Mediation
Brief). The plaintiffs also claimed that MHSAA provided inferior benefits (e.g., inferior
athletic tournament facilities, playing rules and promotion and publicity). Id. All of these
claims were settled through court-ordered mediation in the summer of 2001, leaving only
the inferior sports seasons claim to be litigated. See Kristen Boike, Rethinking Gender
Opportunities: Nontraditional Sports Season and Local Preferences, 39 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 597 n.7 (2006); Chaundhry & Greenberger, supra note 11, at 13-14.
Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 805, 807. The girls' sports at issue
45.
include: volleyball in the winter; basketball, tennis, Lower Peninsula swimming and diving
in the fall; and soccer and Lower Peninsula golf in the spring. Id.
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Equal Protection Clause, Title IX, and ELCRA. 46 The court then
ordered the MHSAA to submit a compliance plan for the realignment
47

of seasons.

B. Plaintiffs' Claims: How Michigan'sNontraditionalSports Seasons

Constitute Legally Inequitable Treatment
According to the plaintiffs, the current policies and practices of
the MHSAA caused both psychological and generalized harms to
Michigan girls. 48
The MHSAA is an incorporated, nonprofit
membership organization that acts as the governing body for
interscholastic sports in the state of Michigan. 49 The MHSAA is
comprised of over 700 Michigan high schools, both public and
private. 50 While first created under the authority of the Michigan
legislature in 1972 as an official state organization, in 1995 the
MHSAA's official designation was removed. 51
However, this
modification did not substantially change either the structure or
52
operation of the MHSAA, or its relationship with member schools.
The MHSAA regulates interscholastic athletic competition
between its member schools and sets standards for school membership
and student eligibility to participate in interscholastic athletics. 53 The
MHSAA also requires member schools to register their coaches,
requires use of MHSAA-registered game officials, and issues penalties
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 862.
Id.
Id. at 836-37.

49.
Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 810. The MHSAA's Articles of
Incorporation stated that its purpose is:
To create, establish and provide for, supervise and conduct interscholastic
athletic programs throughout the state consistent with the educational values of
the high school curriculums, the interest in physical welfare and fitness of the
students participating therein by giving the opportunity to participate in
athletics designed to meet the needs and abilities of all and to make and adopt
such rules and regulations and interpretation thereof to carry out the foregoing
and to further provide for the training and registering of officials and to publish
and distribute such information consistent therewith and to do any and all acts
and services necessary to carry out the intent hereof.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 811 (citing MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 380.1289 (1976) and 380.11(a)(4)
(2001)). The Michigan Legislature amended the School Code, removing the MHSAA's
official designation, but confirmed that school districts were still authorized to "join
organizations [such as the MHSAA] as part of performing the functions of the school
district." Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1 la(4) (2006).
52.
Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 811.
53.
Id. For example, the 'MHSAA has adopted playing rules and regulations for
each of the MHSSA- sanctioned sports Id.
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for violations of MHSAA rules and regulations. 54 Additionally, the
MHSAA provides structure to interscholastic athletics throughout the
state. 55 Among other things, the MHSAA schedules sport seasons,
sets practice dates, determines the maximum number of games to be
played, limits the scope of permissible activities outside the defined
season for a sport, and sponsors state championship tournaments
56
open only to member schools.
By the time the Communities for Equity case reached the
district court in the fall of 2001, the plaintiffs' sole remaining claim
alleged that the "MHSAA schedules athletic seasons and tournaments
for six girls' sports during less advantageous times of the academic
year than boys' athletic seasons and tournaments, and that this
57
scheduling" of seasons constitutes inequitable gender discrimination.
Specifically, the "plaintiffs claim[ed] that all of these sports, with the
exception of girls' golf, are played in a nontraditional season," which
are disadvantageous times to play those sports. 58 As a result, the
MHSAA's "scheduling of girls' sports in this manner negatively
affect[ed] Michigan girls' opportunities to be recruited for college
teams, to participate in national club sports and Olympic development
programs, and to experience promotions like basketball's 'March
Madness,' among other harms." 59 In addition to these sport-specific
harms, plaintiffs also claimed that such scheduling resulted in
psychological harm on girls by inflicting a "stigmatic injury," "sending
54.

Id. at 812. "To register as an official, a person must complete an application

form indicating which sports he or she will officiate, pass a written examination on
MHSAA rules and regulations, and pay a registration fee." Id. 'Member schools who violate
any of the MHSAA's rules are subject to a wide range of penalties including censure,
probation, bans from regular season competition and MHSAA tournaments, forfeiture, and
expulsion." Id.
55.
Id. at 814.
56.
Id. The necessity of MHSAA's structure and organization is evidenced by the
fact that "90 percent of high schools ... and 60 percent of middle schools are members of
MHSAA." Id.
57.
Id. at 807. With respect to plaintiffs other claims of injury, the "IvHSAA agreed
to add two additional girls' tournaments ...based on input from MHSAA member schools
and their female athletes." Chaudhry & Greenberger, supra note 11, at 41 n.61 The
"MHSAA also agreed to conduct the girls' basketball semi-finals and finals in the [same]
facility where the boys play ... to use its best efforts to secure first-rate fast-pitch softball
facilities, to ensure its golf tournaments will consist of the same number of holes of golf for
girls and boys at each level of the tournament, and to treat boys and girls equally with
respect to television, radio, newspapers, and written programs produced for MHSAA
tournaments." Id.
58.
See Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 807 (stating "Lower Peninsula girls'
golf is played in golf s traditional season of spring, but Plaintiffs claim that in the case of
golf in Michigan, the non-traditional season of fall is far superior to the spring season, and
fall is when Lower Peninsula Michigan boys play golf").
59.
Chaudhry & Greenberger, supra note 11, at 41 n.60.
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them the message that they are 'second class citizens' whose sports
must be fit inscheduled around the existing boys' sports."60
C. MHSAA Justifications:The Legitimate Reasons for Nontraditional
Sports Seasons
The MHSAA countered the plaintiffs' allegations of harm by
arguing "that the girls' sports at issue are scheduled in superior or
equal playing seasons" that maximize female participation in athletics
in the state. 6 1 The MHSAA presented several justifications for
scheduling the various sports in nontraditional seasons, but the
62
district court ultimately rejected all of them.
1. "Logistical Concerns:" Limitations on Facilities, Officials, and
63
Coaches
The first justification raised by the MHSAA was that serious
logistical concerns existed concerning facilities, officials, and coaches. 64
The MHSAA argued that there were not enough gymnasiums, soccer
fields, and pools in Michigan to schedule basketball, soccer, and
swimming concurrently. 65 The combination of these seasons "would
have the effect of reducing participation opportunities for both boys
and girls by forcing schools to cut team size or freshman or junior
varsity teams" altogether in order to provide adequate facilities. 66
Applying the heightened level of scrutiny, however, the court found
that the MHSAA's evidence was insufficient to meet its burden of
production and persuasion. 67 Therefore, the MHSAA failed to justify
the differential treatment. 68 The court also rejected the argument

60.
Id. See Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 815 (quoting John Roberts, the
MHSSA executive director, as having written that "Boys' sports were in [MHSAA member]
schools first and girls' sports, which came later, were fitted around the pre-existing boys
program" (alteration in original)).
61.
Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 839.

62.

Id.

63.
Id. at 839-42.
64.
The MHSAA contends that the existing seasons are necessary based on
logistical concerns to ensure "the greatest number of participation opportunities in
interscholastic sports." Id. This can only be accomplished by "being able to sponsor
freshman and junior varsity teams, larger squads, and maximum playing time for the
most" students possible. Id.
65.
Id. at 840.

66.
67.

Id.
Id.

68.
The court found the evidence insufficient to demonstrate that schools have
inadequate facilities since the evidence presented was "almost exclusively anecdotal." Id.
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that other states, where athletic seasons for both genders are
scheduled concurrently, had lower participation numbers than in
69
Michigan.
The MHSAA also contended that there were insufficient
numbers of coaches and officials in Michigan to schedule sports such
as soccer and swimming concurrently for both boys and girls. 70 The
court rejected this justification as well, finding once again that the
evidence presented by the MHSAA was insufficient. 7 1 Furthermore,
the court noted that "[t]hirty-seven [other] states, as well as Upper
Peninsula schools, are able to schedule boys' and girls' soccer
concurrently. Presumably, the Upper Peninsula and those other
72
states have enough officials and coaches."
73
2. High School Athletes' Preference for Current Seasons

Second, the MHSAA offered survey evidence asserting that
Michigan girls and member schools prefer to play in the current
seasons.7 4 While the survey did purport to show that a clear majority
of female students as well as member schools prefer the current
seasons, the court concluded that the survey suffered from "design
flaws and bias" and refused to rely upon it to establish a legitimate
75
justification for the MHSAA's current scheduling of sports seasons.
The court also noted that if the current seasons were found to violate
Id. at 841-42. "The MHSAA points to the high ranking of Michigan among the
69.
states for numbers of boys and girls participating in various sports [is] evidence that the
current scheduling of seasons maximizes participation opportunities" and other states that
schedule seasons concurrently have lower participation numbers because scheduling in
those states "creates problems that decrease participation opportunities for students." Id.
at 841 The court rejected this argument finding it "circumstantial evidence that simply
proves little." Id.
70.
Id. at 842.
Regarding the insufficient number of coaches, the court stated, "[T]he empirical
71.
evidence on this point was too sparse to make a finding that this is true. The
circumstantial evidence that logistical problems could be resolved or would not exist in the
first place was just as strong." Id.
Id.
72.
73.
See id. at 844-45.
74.
Id. at 842-44. The MHSAA commissioned Western Michigan University's
Evaluation Center to conduct the survey after the CFE filed its lawsuit. Id. at 842-43.
75.
Id. at 843. The court found the survey of female students suffered from design
flaws and bias because (1) "the survey listed only potential negative consequences of
moving the girls' seasons at issue" while "[n]o benefits of changing the seasons were
presented; (2) only 60 of the MHSAA's 729 member schools participated"; (3) "only onethird of the girls in [those] 60 schools were surveyed, and nearly one-third of [those]
respondents participated in sports that are not played in disadvantageous seasons"; and (4)
"the original, written survey responses were destroyed ... before Plaintiffs or their expert
could review them." Id.
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the law, they would "violate the law regardless of the preferences of
the member schools." 76 In addition, the court noted that while several
accomplished female athletes testified about the disadvantages of the
current seasons, the MHSAA provided no testimony of any girl or
77
parent who favored keeping the current seasons.
'7 8
3. Establishing an "Independent Identity"

Finally, the MHSAA asserted that its current nontraditional
seasons give girls an "independent identity," a benefit resulting from
having their own independent athletic seasons. 79 For example, the
association argued "that playing basketball in the fall rather than the
traditional winter season benefits girls because they do not have to
compete with boys' basketball for attention . . . and thus receive

increased recruiting opportunities and media coverage. ' 0
The
MHSAA offered testimony to support its assertion that having
separate basketball seasons demonstrated that girls bring fans to
their own games and can be successful without a boys' team in the
same season.8 1
However, the court instead found that separate
basketball seasons sent a message that girls' basketball programs are
merely a secondary consideration of the MHSAA and must be
scheduled around the boys' programs in the regular season.8 2 The
court went on to note that "[g]irls' basketball programs ...

are just as

important as boys' programs, and girls deserve to play in the 'regular'
83
season, too."

76.

Id. at 844. Stating that "[t]o the extent that the Court has considered

preferences of the member schools . . . it has only been in the context of assuming that
member schools may have had actual non-discriminatory reasons ... for preferring certain
seasons for certain sports over others," the court again questioned the design of the
questionnaire form, while also pointing out a history of the MHSAA making changes to
scheduling unilaterally without regard to member preference. Id. at 844-45.
77.
Id. at 843.
78.
See id. at 845.

79.

Id.

80.
Id. "The concept of having an 'independent identity' is... based on the premise
that boys will 'overshadow' girls in fan support and media coverage if boys and girls play
basketball in the same season." Id.
81.
Id.
82.
The court found that "separate basketball seasons sends a message that the
girls' basketball programs cannot be 'fitted in' to the 'regular' basketball season of winter."

Id.
83.

Id.
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D. Holding and Subsequent Case History
After reviewing all of the testimony and other evidence
presented by CFE and the MHSAA, the district court held that the
current scheduling of athletic seasons violated the Equal Protection
Clause, Title IX, and Michigan state law (ELCRA). First, the court
found that the MHSAA was a state actor, and thus subject to liability
for constitutional violations under the Fourteenth Amendment.8 4
Next, the court found that the scheduling of six girls' sports in
nontraditional seasons constitutes gender classification, which
triggers a presumption of discrimination based on gender and
warrants a heightened level of scrutiny by the court. The MHSAA
was then required to justify its classification by providing an
"exceedingly persuasive" justification that demonstrated that the
classification "serves important governmental objectives and the
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."8 5 The court found that the MHSAA
failed to meet its burden in this regard, because "none of the girls'
sports at issue are scheduled in the advantageous season."8 6
Additionally, the court held that while the MHSAA's justifications
were
"important," the discriminatory
scheduling
was not
"substantially related to the achievement of those asserted
objectives."8 7 The court also found that the MHSAA's empirical

84.
The court relied on the Supreme Court ruling in Brentwood Academy v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288, 290 (2001), which found the
TSSAA to be a state actor. The Supreme Court in that case considered the facts relating to
the structure and role of the TSSAA in the administration of high school athletics in the
state of Tennessee. The Court noted, "the nominally private character of the [TSSAA] is
overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its
composition and workings, and there is not substantial reason to claim unfairness in
applying constitutional standards to it." Id. at 298. The court in Communities for Equity
held that the nature and function of the MHSAA was virtually identical to that of the
TSSAA, and, similarly to the TSSAA, the MHSAA was a state actor. 178 F. Supp. 2d at
847.
85.
Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 848.
86.
Id. at 850. To determine the less advantageous season, the court examined
several factors. For example, the court took into account when the corresponding college
season is played, the ease of recruitment for college sports, weather considerations, length
of season, and the possibility for interstate competition. Id. at 817-39.
87.
Id. at 850. See id. (explaining that "The MHSAA argue[d] that its current
scheduling system maximizes high school athletic participation opportunities by creating
optimal use of existing facilities, officials, and coaches [thus allowing] more teams in a
sport or more spots on a team"). Additionally, the MHSAA claimed that the quality of the
programs are maximized by the current scheduling as a result of better officials and
coaches being able to work over two separate seasons. Id.

876

VANDERBILT J. OFENTERTAINMENT AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 9:3:861

8 8s
evidence in support of its justifications was "wholly insufficient.
Therefore, the court concluded that the MHSAA violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by its current scheduling of seasons for the
89
sports at issue.

The court held that the MHSAA was also subject to liability
under Title IX. First, the court found that the MHSAA had the
required "controlling authority" necessary to be responsible for the
scheduling of interscholastic sports in Michigan. 90 Therefore, the
MHSAA had "implicitly contracted with the federal government and
had notice to obey the conditions under which member schools receive
federal funding." 91 Furthermore, the court found that the plaintiffs
established a Title IX violation by demonstrating that the MHSAA's
sports season schedule denied Michigan high school female athletes
92
the benefits that they would "otherwise enjoy" if they were male.
Finally, the court rejected the MHSAA's argument that Title IX claims
require proof of animus or discriminatory motive on the part of the
MHSAA. 93 According to the court, the unequal opportunities for girls
resulting from the scheduling indicated that the policy was
94
discriminatory on its face and thus violated Title IX.
After concluding that the MHSAA's scheduling of girls' sports
seasons discriminated against girls and that the MHSAA cannot
justify such discrimination, the district court ordered the MHSAA to
submit to the court a compliance plan detailing how the association
would bring its scheduling of high school sports into compliance with
the law by the 2003-2004 school year. 95 In July 2002, the MHSAA
88.
In the eyes of the court, the MHSAA provided only anecdotal and weak
circumstantial evidence, which did not sufficiently justify forcing girls to bear all of the
disadvantageous playing seasons alone to solve possible logistical problems. Id. at 851.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 855.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. The court reasoned that scheduling sports in disadvantageous seasons for
one sex violates Title IX when "the resulting harms are substantial enough to deny equal
participation opportunities and benefits" for that gender. Id. at 856.
93.
According to the court, in any Title IX case, "[d]ifferent treatment can still
result in equal opportunities for boys and girls, but it also may not, which is the reason for
analyzing and comparing the benefits and the burdens of the differential treatment." Id. at
856.
94.
This part of the court's conclusion was based on the evidence described in the
findings of fact, which showed that all of the girls' sports at issue "are subject to
disadvantages," as a result of being denied the right to play their sports in the same season
that the boys do. Id. at 857. In the case of girls-only volleyball, they had been denied the
right to play during volleyball's traditional season, as all boys-only teams do. Id. at 856.
95.
The court noted that the association did not have to combine seasons in any
particular sport but that if it did not, girls and boys must share in the advantages and
disadvantages of the resulting scheduling. Id. at 861-62.

2007]

CHANGING SEASONS, CHANGING TIMES

submitted its plan to switch girls' golf, swimming, and tennis with the
boys' seasons in those sports; girls would retain the current
nontraditional seasons for basketball, volleyball, and soccer. 96 The
district court rejected this plan, finding that the plan disadvantaged a
much larger percentage of girls than boys and that the MHSAA chose
to switch those sports that suffered the least substantial harms. 97 In
addition, the court found that even if the MHSAA switched all sports
other than basketball and volleyball-the two sports that the MHSAA
most vigorously opposed switching-a larger percentage of girls than
boys would still be disadvantaged, because these were the two most
popular girls' sports. 98 Therefore, the district court ordered that the
girls' basketball and volleyball seasons must be switched in order to
achieve equity. 99 The MHSAA subsequently submitted a second
compliance plan switching these seasons, which was approved by the
district court despite objections by the plaintiffs.1 00
The MHSAA appealed the ruling of the district court, and, on
appeal, the Sixth Circuit, finding a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, affirmed the district court's decision and declined to address
either the Title IX or the state law claims. 10 1 The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorariin 2005, only to vacate and remand the case back to
the Sixth Circuit in light of a recent opinion, City of Rancho Palos
Verdes v. Abrams.'0 2 On August 16, 2006 the Sixth Circuit once again

96.
Id. at 862.
97.
See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 1:98-CV-479, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14220, at *15-16 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2002) (injunctive order and opinion).

98.
Id.
99.
Id. at *16. The court ordered the MHSAA to switch girls' volleyball and
basketball and also to either (1) "combine all [other] sports so that both sexes play in the
same season"; (2) reverse two girls' seasons with two boys' seasons; or (3) combine seasons
in two sports and reverse seasons in one of the remaining sports at issue. Id. at *19-20.
100.
See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 377 F.3d 504, 514 (6th
Cir. 2004). In addition to switching the girls' volleyball and basketball seasons the second
plan chose to switch girls' tennis and golf seasons with the boys' seasons in those sports in
the Lower Peninsula and in the Upper Peninsula, switch girls' soccer to the fall. See
Amended Compliance Plan, Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 1:98CV-479 (W.D. Mich. filed Oct. 30, 2002), available at http://www.mhsaa.coml
news/amendplan.pdf.
101.
Cmtys. for Equity, 377 F.3d at 514.
102.
Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Cmtys. for Equity, 544 U.S. 1012 (2005). See
also City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 125 S. Ct. 1453 (2005). The
Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit's decision because the circuit court did not
consider whether Title IX's statutory remedy precluded Equal Protection relief. Cmtys. for
Equity, 544 U.S at 1012. Rancho Palos Verdes addressed this issue of preclusion, holding
that a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not available when there is a provision of express,
private means of redress in the statute which is an indication that Congress intended the
remedies in the substantive statute to be exclusive. Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 121.
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upheld the district court's 2001 opinion that the current setup of
seasons discriminates against girls in some sports. 10 3 The MHSAA
once again appealed, asking for a rehearing en banc before all of the
Sixth Circuit judges. 10 4 This appeal was denied, 10 5 leaving the
10 6 If
MHSAA one final option-an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
the appeal is not heard, the significance of the Sixth Circuit decision
will have a far reaching impact on Title IX litigation in interscholastic
sports.
III. SETTING THE BAR Too HIGH: A CRITIQUE OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
APPROACH TO TITLE IX AND EQUAL PROTECTION LITIGATION AT THE
INTERSCHOLASTIC LEVEL

The combination of holdings over almost ten years of litigation
in the Communities for Equity v. MHSAA cases has led to an
excessively high standard of scrutiny that is applied broadly to
virtually any decision made between male and female athletic
programs. By holding the MHSAA liable under both Title IX and
Section 1983, the court treated the scheduling decisions as facial
gender classifications, which require intermediate scrutiny by the
court, thus creating a presumption of discrimination and shifting the
burden to the defendant athletic association to prove a substantial
governmental interest. 10 7 As one of the first major in-depth cases
involving Title IX and Equal Protection compliance in interscholastic
athletic programs, this case and the approach taken by the Sixth
Circuit in Communities for Equity will most likely have major
implications regarding the decisions made nationally, not just for

103.
2006).

Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 459 F.3d 676 (6th Cir.

104.
Press Release, Michigan High School Athletic Association, MHSAA Petition
Filed In Seasons Litigation (Aug. 31, 2006), available at http://www.mhsaa.com/
news/enbancpetition.html.
105.
Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 02-1127 (6th Cir. Dec.
7, 2006).
106.
The MHSSA filed a petition for certiorarion January 29, 2007. See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Cmtys. for Equity, 75 U.S.L.W., No. 061038 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2007). According to the MHSAA's Communications director, John
Johnson, the appeal will contend that the Sixth Circuit should have based its ruling on
Title IX alone and not addressed violations of the Equal Protection Clause and Michigan's
Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, both of which place the burden of discriminatory proof on
the defendant MHSAA. Joe Slezak, Sports Seasons Case Headed Back to Supreme Court,
DEARBORN
PRESS
&
GUIDE,
Dec.
17,
2006,
http://www.pressandguide.com
stories/121706/spo_20061217011.shtml.
107.
Cmtys. for Equity, 459 F.3d at 693.
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interscholastic athletics, but also quite possibly reaching into the
classrooms themselves.

A. FacialGender Classificationsand IntermediateScrutiny: The VMI
Doctrine
The Sixth Circuit's holding that sports season scheduling
constitutes a facial gender classification has important legal
ramifications on the analysis of the possible justifications put forth by
the MHSAA.I08 According to the Supreme Court, the establishment of
a facial gender classification triggers a shift in the burden of
discriminatory proof to the defendant. 10 9 The defendant must provide
an "exceedingly persuasive" justification for the classification. 110
However, despite the Sixth Circuit's holding to the contrary, while this
may be an excessively high standard to meet, it is not entirely clear
the MHSAA failed to satisfy even this heightened burden of proof.
1. The "Exceedingly Persuasive" VMI Doctrine
In analyzing the plaintiffs' Equal Protection argument, the
district court based its analysis on the Sixth Circuit decision in United
States v. Virginia ("VMI).111 In VMI, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of the Virginia Military Institute's (VMI) all-male
admissions policy, ultimately concluding that the policy of admitting
males was facially discriminatory and thus violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 1 2 The Court found that VMI's policy denied
women the opportunity to obtain the "unique educational benefit" that
VMI offered to males. 113 Furthermore, the Court rejected Virginia's
proposed parallel program for women established by the state because
114
it was inherently unequal and inferior to VMI.
108.

Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 848 ("It is undisputed that Defendant

intentionally treats boys and girls differently by scheduling their interscholastic sports

seasons at different times of the year.").
109.

See United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996).

110.
111.

Id.
Id.

112.
The Court found the admissions policy was undeniably facially discriminatory
because men were admitted to a one-of-a-kind military college, and women were not.
Women, therefore, were denied the opportunity to receive the benefit of an educational
model that was "not available anywhere else in Virginia." Id. at 540.

113.

Id.

114.
The most notable difference in Virginia's proposed parallel program, the
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), was in its scheduling and degree
offerings. VWIL did not offer degrees or even courses in engineering or advanced math and
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In finding VMI's admission policy facially discriminatory, the
Court applied intermediate scrutiny, making the facial gender
classification presumptively unconstitutional and shifting the burden
to the state to establish an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for
its gender-based classification. 115 Under this approach, the burden of
justification was entirely on the state to show at the very least that
the challenged classification served "important governmental
objectives" and also that the discriminatory means employed were
"substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."" 6
According to the Court, the state failed to meet this burden." 7 The
Court held that separate military institutions for men and women
were unconstitutional because the state did not demonstrate
"substantial equality" in the "educational opportunities" for men and
women.

118

2. The Sixth Circuit's Approach
Finding that the MHSAA's scheduling decisions were made on
the basis of sex (i.e., the sex of the athletes determines in which
seasons they play), the district court analyzed the scheduling of the
Michigan athletic seasons under VMI's standard for a facially genderbased classification." 9 Once the court determined that the scheduling
of seasons constituted a "classification" that differentiates between
males and females on its face, it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to
physics. Id. at 526. Furthermore, the Court found that VWIL's military training employed
a "cooperative" (rather than VMI's "adversative" educational method) and offered no
opportunity for women to experience the unique and rigorous military training that only
VMI could offer. Id. at 548.
115.
The Court described the intermediate scrutiny to justify gender-based
classifications: "Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which
relief is sought, the reviewing court must determine whether the proffered justification is
exceedingly persuasive."' Id. at 532-33.
116.
The VMI Court further defined its standard by explaining, "[t]he justification
must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it
must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females." Id. at 533.
117.
Id. at 554.
118.
Id. The Court found that VWIL's program as a whole was a "pale shadow" of
VM's; in making the determination, the Court examined a wide range of educational
considerations including "the student body, faculty, course offerings, and facilities," as well
as "funding, prestige, alumni support, and influence." Id. at 552-53.
119.
Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 848
(W.D. Mich. 2001). The court found that the MHSAA intentionally treats boys and girls
differently in two ways: (1) some of the sports offered to both girls and boys (e.g., basketball
and golf) are played in a different season for girls than for boys; (2) volleyball, in which the
MHSAA only sanctions a girls' team, is played in a nontraditional season, yet no sport only
offered to boys (e.g., football or wrestling) is scheduled in a nontraditional season. Id.
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prove that the MHSAA had any discriminatory animus or purpose for
a Fourteenth Amendment violation to be found. 120 Rather, plaintiffs
only had to show that the MHSAA intended to treat girls differently
than boys in scheduling their sports seasons. 12 1 Now, under the
heightened standard of review, the MHSAA had the burden of
showing that scheduling team sports in different seasons based on
gender "serves important governmental objectives and that the chosen
scheduling is substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." 12 2 Therefore, the MHSAA had to meet its burden of
establishing an "exceedingly persuasive" justification for treating girls
123
and boys differently.
By finding that the scheduling of seasons discriminates
between genders on its face, the district court and the Sixth Circuit
expanded the scope of intermediate scrutiny, making virtually all
gender-separate programs subject to this heightened standard.124
However, the decision to have separate sports teams based on gender
has long been recognized by the courts as a legitimate classification. 125
Once the decision to have separate teams for males and females is
made, there must be some flexibility within the Equal Protection
Clause analysis for decisions to be made with regard to the teams
without those decisions being further classified as gender-based.
Under the Sixth Circuit's approach, any decision made in which the
gender-based teams do not mirror each other will necessarily treat
girls and boys differently and thus become subject to potential equal

120.

Id.

121.
122.

Id. at 848-49.
Id. at 848 (quoting VMI, 518 U.S. at 532-33) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
123.
Id.
124.
See Reply Brief of Petitioner at *1-5, Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Cmtys.
for Equity, 544 U.S. 1012 (2005) (No. 04-1021), 2005 WL 856035. See generally, Courtney
E. Schafer, Following the Law, Not the Crowd: The Constitutionality of Nontraditional
High School Athletic Seasons, 53 DUKE L. J. 223, 251 (2003), available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/shelllcite.pl?53+Duke+L.+J.+223.
125.
See O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. 23, 449 U.S. 1301, 1307 (1980). The
Court held:
It

seems . . . that there can be little question about the validity of the

classification in most of its normal applications.
Without a gender-based
classification in competitive contact sports, there would be a substantial risk that
boys would dominate the girls' programs and deny them an equal opportunity to
compete in interscholastic events.
Id. at 1307. See also Cape v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir.
1977) (finding that without gender-separated teams, girls effectively could not participate
in athletics).
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protection claims. 126 Moreover, this approach makes it excessively
easy for a plaintiff to shift the burden of proof to the defendant since
any difference between boys' and girls' teams will arguably have
disadvantageous consequences. 127 The Sixth Circuit standard could
therefore expand to potentially expose school administrators, athletic
directors, and even coaches themselves to Equal Protection claims,
simply by their having made a decision regarding a gender-based
1 28

team.

3. Focus on the Individual's Ability to Receive Benefits, Not the
Fundamental Benefit of the Opportunity to Participate
Under VMJ's standard, once the scheduling of the athletic
seasons was determined to be facially discriminatory, the burden
shifted to require that the MHSAA provide an "exceedingly
persuasive" justification.1 29 However, in rejecting the justification
provided by the MHSAA, both the district court and the Sixth Circuit
focused on the disadvantages incurred by individual elite female
athletes, who comprise only a small percentage of Michigan's total
number of female athletes. 30 The courts' analysis centered on the
126.
Under the Sixth Circuit's approach potentially "every trivial detail of how men's
and women's programs are implemented [could become] a constitutional case." Reply Brief
of Petitioner, supra note 124, at *5.
127.
For example, the MHSAA argues that "scheduling practice times in a shared
gymnasium or assigning referees to officiate games will inevitably lead to minor differences
that someone will deem as disadvantageous" but yet will never garner an "exceedingly
persuasive" justification. Id.
It is argued that, if boys and girls basketball is played in the same season,
128.
[T]he over 300 coaches in the state who presently coach both the boys' and girls'
teams . . . will be forced to choose

which

gender-based team to coach.

Accordingly, half of the athletes that they presently coach will have to adjust to a
different coach, who may likely be less experienced and less qualified that the
present coach. If an experienced and accomplished coach opts to coach the boys'
basketball team in the winter, thus causing that coach's former girls' basketball
team to thereafter be coached by a less experienced and/or less qualified coach
[in this circumstance, under the Sixth Circuit approach,] the school district and
the coach have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying the female student-athletes
equal protection because they no longer have the benefit of the coach's experience
and expertise.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Basketball Coaches Association of Michigan, Inc. at * 11, Mich. High
Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Cmtys. for Equity, 544 U.S. 1012 (2005) (No. 04-1021), 2005 WL
1334151.
Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 459 F.3d 676, 692 (6th Cir.
129.
2006).
For instance, the district court found that girls playing basketball in the fall are
130.
disadvantaged because: (1) they do not have the opportunity to participate in special events
for professional teams, or in national "shoot-outs" such as the Nike and Blue Star
shootouts; (2) they "do not get to participate in 'March Madness' or the excitement and
publicity surrounding this time period"; (3) they must play one game a week on Thursday
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impact that current MHSAA scheduling has on college scholarships,
Such
recruiting, and programs disconnected from the MHSAA.
programs included: United States Volleyball Association matches; club
swimming; the American Youth Soccer Organization; the United
131
States Soccer Federation; the Olympic Development Program.
However, this focus on the disadvantages associated with developing
and preparing athletes for collegiate-level competition ignored the
purpose and goals of the MHSAA itself.
In attempting to define VMJs "substantially equal" standard,
the MHSAA and various amici curiae assert that interscholastic
athletic programs are designed not as a breeding ground for future
collegiate athletes, but rather "to enhance the educational
experiences" for all high school athletes, to "promote participation and
sportsmanship," and "to maximize the achievement of educational
goals." 132 The MHSAA Articles of Incorporation also provide that its
goals include "the interest in physical welfare and fitness of the
students participating therein by giving the opportunity to participate
in athletics designed to meet the needs and abilities of all." 133 Thus,
the MHSAA recognizes that high school athletics serve a greater
purpose than developing only elite level athletes; the organization
seeks to provide the greatest number of athletic opportunities to all
students of all abilities.
Had the Sixth Circuit focused its analysis on the overall
opportunity to participate, rather than on individual benefits to
female athletes, the "exceedingly persuasive" standard likely would
The MHSAA argued that the current
have been satisfied.1 3 4
scheduling system maximizes opportunities for participation 'by
creating optimal use of existing facilities, officials and coaches,
135
thereby permitting more teams in a sport or more spots on a team."
Statistics show that Michigan ranks as one of the highest among all
states in total participation by male and female high school
athletes. 136 The MHSAA contends that these high participation
numbers, especially with regard to female athletes, show that the
(a school night) to avoid conflicting with football, although that game could be played on
Fridays in the winter; and (4) they are less likely to make the Parade All-American lists
that come out in March, because they have been "forgotten." Cmtys. for Equity vs. Mich.
High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 818-20 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
131.
Id. at 817-835.
132.
Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 126, at *4.
Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 810 (quoting MHSAA Articles of
133.
Incorporation).
Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 126, at *3.
134.
135.
Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 810.
NFHS Survey, supra note 20.
136.
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W

current scheduling system maximizes student athletic participation
and therefore promotes its goal of providing athletic opportunities to
the maximum number of student athletes. 137 Furthermore, statistics
suggest that states forced to schedule both sexes in the same season
experience drops in participation rates as a result of the change. 138
Although the district court conceded that the MHSAA's
logistical concerns were important for maintaining the maximum
opportunity for participation, it ultimately held that under the VMI
standard, the evidence failed to demonstrate that the scheduling was
"substantially related" to the achievement of the objectives. 13 9
However, by focusing the objective on individual development of
female athletes hoping to play at the collegiate level, the court
ensured the MHSAA could not meet its burden under VMI. If the
governmental objective focused broadly on maximizing female athletic
participation opportunities, the MHSAA's justification for scheduling
sports in nontraditional seasons could be exceedingly persuasive.
B. Knock-Out Punch:Are Section 1983 Claims Precluded by Title IX?

After the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
determination that the MHSAA's scheduling violated the Equal
Protection Clause, the MHSAA filed a petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court.1 40 However, instead of addressing the case on the

137.
Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 841.
138.
A report by the National Federation of High School Athletic Associations shows
that:
North Dakota reported a 10.6% drop in girls' basketball participation and a 7%
drop in volleyball participation; South Dakota, within two years of the change,
dropped 13.1% in girls' basketball; Montana, within two years of the change,
dropped 10.9% in girls' basketball and 8.1% in girls' volleyball; and in West
Virginia, since the change was made in 1985-86, the number of girls and boys
playing high school basketball has dropped 19.4% and 27.4% respectively.
Brief for Michigan Interscholastic Athletic Administrators Association as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at *5, Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Cmtys. for Equity, 544 U.S.
113 (2005) (No. 04-1021), 2005 WL 1334153 (citing Memorandum of Jack Roberts,
Executive Director, National Federation of High School Athletic Associations, to
Representative Counsel (November 5, 2004)).
139.
Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Cmtys. for Equity, 459 F.3d 676, 693-94 (6th
Cir. 2006) (discussing the district court holding that "even if the MHSAA had sufficiently
proven their point about athletic participation opportunities, 'that would not justify forcing
girls to bear all of the disadvantageous playing seasons alone to solve logistical problems"';
noting that "a large gross-participation number alone does not demonstrate that
discriminatory scheduling of boys' and girls' athletic seasons is substantially related to the
achievement of important government objectives").
140.
Id. at 679. In Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High School Athletic Ass'n (CFE1), 377
F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2004), the Sixth Circuit affirmed only on the grounds of the Equal
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merits, the Court vacated the circuit court decision and remanded the
case for further consideration, directing the Sixth Circuit to reconsider
the case in light of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams. 14 1 The Court's
order required the Sixth Circuit to consider whether Title IX provides
the exclusive remedy for the alleged violations and thus precludes
plaintiffs from seeking additional remedies under Section 1983.142
Currently, federal courts disagree on whether a plaintiff
asserting a Title IX claim may also assert a Section 1983 claim based
on a constitutional privilege or Title IX itself. 143 The Second, Third,
and Seventh Circuits have held that Congress intended Title IX to be
144
exclusive, therefore precluding additional Section 1983 claims.
Conversely, the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that Tile
IX does not preclude such claims predicated on either constitutional or
145
Title IX violations.

Protection violation. Finding that violation sufficient to mandate a change in seasons, the
court did not reach the Title IX or state-law issues. See id. at 513.
141.
Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Cmtys. for Equity, 544 U.S. 1012 (2005);
Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 133 (2005).
142.
Cmtys. for Equity, 459 F.3d 676 at 679-80. Following the grant/vacate/remand
order's procedure, the result in CFE I must be altered:
Where intervening developments, or recent developments that we have reason to
believe the court below did not fully consider, reveal a reasonable probability
that the decision below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if
given the opportunity for further consideration, and where it appears that such a
redetermination may determine the ultimate outcome of the litigation, a GVR
order is.

.

. potentially appropriate.

Id. (quoting from Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996) (ellipsis in original)).
143.
Id. at 689.
144.
For courts precluding a plaintiff from asserting an additional claim under
Section 1983 for a violation of Title IX itself or other constitutional rights, see, e.g.,
Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 756-59 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
that a plaintiff may not bring a Section 1983 claim based upon the violation of Title IX
itself); Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding Title IX
preempts a claim under Section 1983 for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause against school officials in their official and personal capacities); Pfeiffer
v. Marion Center Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that Title IX
precludes Section 1983 claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause against the school district).
145.
For courts holding that Title IX does not preclude Section 1983 claims
predicated on constitutional or Title IX violations see, e.g., Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d
1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that Title IX does not preclude claims brought under
Section 1983 for a violation of either the Fourteenth Amendment or Title IX itself against
university officials in their official and individual capacities); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d
1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs Section 1983 action to enforce
independent constitutional rights was not barred by Title IX); Lillard v. Shelby County Bd.
of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 723-24 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that Title IX does not preclude
Section 1983 claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive Due Process
Clause against state actors in their official and individual capacities and implying in dicta
that Title IX would not preclude Section 1983 claims based on Title IX itself).
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1. The Rancho Palos Verdes Line of Cases
In order to analyze the Communities for Equity case in light of
Rancho Palos Verdes, the Sixth Circuit examined the line of cases
leading up to that decision. The Supreme Court's decision in
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
provides the basis for the Court's later decision in Rancho Palos
Verdes. 146 The Court in Sea Clammers held that the plaintiffs could
not use Section 1983 as a vehicle to enforce federal statutory laws
where the acts themselves contained "unusually elaborate
enforcement provisions." 147 Focusing on Congress's intent to provide a
comprehensive enforcement scheme under the federal statute, the
Court determined that the statute in question precluded private
enforcement through Section 1983.148 The Court has subsequently
applied the Sea Clammers doctrine when deciding whether a federal
statute precludes a plaintiff from indirectly asserting violations of that
statute under Section 1983.149

Several years later, the Court applied the Sea Clammers rule
to the preclusion of a constitutional claim under Section 1983.150 In
Smith v. Robinson, the plaintiffs, parents of an eight-year-old boy with
cerebral palsy, brought suit against a school district asserting
violations of the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to Section
1983.151

The plaintiffs in Smith attempted to use Section 1983 to

enforce a constitutional remedy in addition to the remedies available

146.
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
The plaintiffs in Sea Clammers were fisherman who worked off the coast of New York and
New Jersey and brought suit under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1251 (2000), the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §
1401, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of the preceding statutes as a result of
damage to fishing grounds caused by polluters dumping sewage and other waste in the
ocean. Id. at 4-5.
147.
Id. at 13.
148.
Id. at 20.
149.
See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423
(1987) (stating that Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal
statutory rights unless "express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself
[shows] that Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement"); see also Suter v.
Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1992) (stating that Section 1983 may not enforce a
violation of a federal statute "where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the
statute in the enactment itself').
150.
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
151.
Id. at 994.

20071
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under the EHA. 152 The Court held that the plaintiffs' Section 1983
claim was precluded, because the constitutional claims were "virtually
identical" to the statutory claim and Congress intended the statute to
be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff should find
redress. 153 Under these conditions, the Court concluded that the
remedy provided under the statute subsumes the remedy for a
constitutional violation under Section 1983.154 The key issue, then,
was whether Congress intended the statute to be the exclusive remedy
155
through which the plaintiffs may assert their claims.
Finally, in Rancho Palos Verdes, the plaintiff brought suit
against a municipal government after he was denied a permit to build
a radio tower on his property. 15 6 The plaintiff brought claims under
the Telecommunications Act (TCA), seeking damages and attorney's
fees under Section 1983.157 Citing the Sea Clammers doctrine, the
Court analyzed whether Congress intended the judicial remedy
expressly authorized in the TCA to "coexist with an alternative
remedy available in a Section 1983 action" or whether the statute
provided its own comprehensive enforcement scheme which would
preclude a Section 1983 claim. 158 Noting that the TCA provided more
restrictive remedies than remedies provided under the constitutional
claim, the Court concluded that Congress intended the TCA remedies
to be the exclusive relief available to a plaintiff and thus precluded
relief under Section 1983.159

152.
Id. at 1009. The plaintiffs brought their Section 1983 claim against the school
district for allegedly denying their son a "free appropriate public education." Id. at 994-95.
However, the EHA due process claim did not involve the same facts or legal theories and
thus would have warranted different relief. Id. at 1015.
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
Id. In analyzing this question, the Court looked closely at the legislative history
of the EHA reasoning that the "carefully tailored administrative and judicial mechanisms"
in the statute expressly communicated Congress' intent to preclude reliance on Section
1983. Id. at 1109-12.
156.
544 U.S. 113, 118 (2005).
157.
Id. Plaintiff essentially used both statutes to enforce the violation of rights
created by the TCA. Id. at 118.
158.
Id. at 119-20.
159.
Id. at 126-27. Because the administrative and judicial remedies authorized in
the TCA are detailed, yet more restrictive than the remedies available under Section 1983,
the Court reasoned that it would contravene Congress's intent to allow the plaintiff to
recover under both statutes where Congress had provided in the TCA precisely the
remedies it considered appropriate. Id. at 1459-62.
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2. The Circuit Split: Application of the Sea Clammers/Rancho Palos
Verdes doctrine to Title IX
Although there is a very clear split among the federal courts
concerning the preclusion of Section 1983 claims by Title IX, the Sixth
Circuit, relying on prior case law, claimed its approach was unaffected
by Rancho Palos Verdes, despite the Supreme Court's order to
reconsider its decision in light of the case. 160 The Communities for
Equity court, in reliance on its previous decision in Lillard, held that
Title IX does not provide plaintiffs an exclusive remedy, thus
rendering the Sea Clammers doctrine inapplicable and ultimately
allowing plaintiffs to seek remedies under Section 1983 as well as
under Title IX.161 Acknowledging Sea Clammers, the court recognized
that the key inquiry for the federal courts is "whether Congress
intended the remedies in the substantive statute to be exclusive."'162
Stating that it was bound by Lillard, the court went on to conclude
that the Sea Clammers doctrine did not apply to Title IX, because
1 63
Title IX is not comprehensive enough to be exclusive.
As the dissent points out, however, the Second, Third, and
Seventh Circuits have all held that Sea Clammers does apply and
Title IX provides an exclusive remedy.1 6 4 Since the Supreme Court
concluded that Title IX contains an implied damages remedy, these
circuits reason that Title IX "gives plaintiffs access to the full panoply
of judicial remedies."' 165 The reliance of the Sixth Circuit on its
decision in Lillard improperly ignores Rancho Palos Verdes altogether
and goes against the combination of Supreme Court rulings that
appear to support preclusion of Section 1983 claims by Title IX.166

160.
2006).

Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 459 F.3d 676, 689 (6th Cir.

161.
Id. at 689-91.
162.
Id. at 684.
163.
Id. at 689. "The Lillard court found that the dearth of remedies authorized in
Title IX, either private or public, indicated that Congress did not intend to preclude
recovery under [Section] 1983 when it enacted Title IX."
County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir. 1996).

164.

Id.

(citing Lillard v. Shelby

Id.

165.
Id. (quoting Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 862-63 (7th Cir.
1996)) (stating that Waid held "that such access indicates Congress's intent to preclude
reliance on [Section] 1983").
166.
See Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. 113 (2005) (holding that the availability of a
private judicial remedy, while not conclusively establishing congressional intent to
preclude Section 1983 relief, does give rise to an "ordinary inference that the remedy
provided in the statute is exclusive."); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch, 503 U.S. 60,
72 (1992) (allowing both compensatory and punitive damages in a private action for gender
discrimination under Title IX, and holding that "Congress did not intend to limit the
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Therefore, as suggested in the Communities for Equity dissent,
"because the Supreme Court has held that Congress intended to create
a private judicial remedy in Title IX, and because the non-existence of
such a remedy has repeatedly given rise to finding that Congress did
not intend to preclude relief sought through Section 1983," Congress
did intend for Title IX to be the "exclusive avenue" through which a
plaintiff may assert a gender-based equal protection claim. 167 Under
this approach, plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims would be precluded,
which would in turn lift the court's intermediate scrutiny analysis of
the MHSAA's athletic season scheduling, leaving the case to be
scrutinized solely under the less burdensome Title IX standard.
C. Negative Implications of Sixth Circuit Ruling
Although Communities for Equity and other similar
organizations claim it as a victory for gender equity in women's
athletics, the Sixth Circuit's ruling may ultimately have a far more
negative impact at the interscholastic level. As the first major piece of
litigation to provide an in-depth analysis of both Title IX and the
Equal Protection Clause with regard to interscholastic athletics, the
Communities for Equity decision has the potential to have a
significant impact on the national level. This decision, while touted as
a "victory for female athletes," also has broader negative implications
with respect to overall female athletic participation levels and loss of
local control over interscholastic athletics.
1. Negative Impacts on Girls' Participation in Interscholastic Athletics
While the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of
the MHSAA's argument that evidence of high participation rates for
high school sports in Michigan is due to the current scheduling
system, statistics from other states show that switching seasons for
girls' sports can lead to a significant decrease in participation. 168
Although dismissed as circumstantial evidence, 169 there does seem to
be a link between scheduling and logistical concerns, such as the
availability of facilities and resources. In over half the states where
basketball is scheduled in the same season for both boys' and girls'

remedies available in a suit brought under Title IX"); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677
(1979) (finding Congress intended to create a private judicial remedy in Title IX).
167.
Cmtys. for Equity, 459 F.3d at 704 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168.
Becker, supra note 11.
169.
Cmtys. for Equity vs. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 841
(W.D. Mich. 2001).
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teams, freshman and junior varsity teams have been eliminated due to
a lack of facilities, coaches, and officials.1 70
With the current
scheduling of seasons, Michigan averages thirty female basketball
players per school, which likely equates to three teams. 171 This is in
stark contrast to other states that schedule their girls' and boys'
seasons concurrently. For example, Kentucky, Ohio and Missouri
average only twenty-two players per school, which likely fields two
teams rather than three. 172 Furthermore, Tennessee has eighteen
players per school; Oklahoma has sixteen, Alabama has thirteen,
Florida has eighteen, and New York has twenty-five. 173 These
numbers indicate that Michigan's nontraditional seasons give females
athletes an increased opportunity to participate in high school
athletics. While Michigan may be the only state left to schedule girls'
basketball in the fall, it does not necessarily follow that they should
have to follow the way other states do it.
Statistics also suggest that participation in volleyball could be
adversely affected by a switch in seasons. "Currently in Michigan,
nearly the same number of girls play basketball in the fall (21,000) as
girls who play volleyball in the winter (21,500).' ' 174 However, in states
where boys' and girls' basketball are played in the same season,
volleyball is often not offered at all. 175 In Georgia, 203 of the schools
that sponsor girls' basketball do not sponsor girls' volleyball, and for
those schools that do offer volleyball, the season is limited to only
fifteen days of competition. 176 As in Georgia, the number of schools
that sponsor boys' and girls' basketball in the same season but do not
sponsor volleyball are similar in other states as well: Oklahoma (380),
Texas (238), and New Jersey (240). 177 While these numbers do not
prove that the scheduling system causes greater participation in
Michigan, they demonstrate both that Michigan's schedule does not
harm participation rates, and that switching the girls' basketball and
volleyball seasons may ultimately result in its own legal challenges.

170.
171.

Becker, supra note 11.
NFHS Survey, supra note 20.

172.

Id.

173.
basketball
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.; see Steele, supra note 9 (noting which states, as of 2001, "still schedule girls'
and volleyball in off seasons").
Schafer, supranote 124, at 251.
Id.
Becker, supra note 11.
Id.
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2. Loss of Local Control over Interscholastic Athletics
The Sixth Circuit's decision significantly expands the court's
role in determining local policy issues on behalf of school districts.
Traditionally, courts defer to the judgment of academic administrators
in a range of areas consistent with the principle of academic
independence.17 8
Courts are usually averse to supplanting
educational judgment when doing so would interfere with a school
board's good faith performance of its core functions, thus giving
179
educational organizations freedom to decide issues of local concern.
The Supreme Court has recognized that "[n]o single tradition in public
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation
of schools."18 0 Federalism concerns and an awareness of the limited
judicial competence in educational administration have led to a
liberal, wide-ranging grant of discretion for public educational
institutions to carry out their educational missions.1 8 1 This discretion
has led the Supreme Court on a number of occasions to affirmatively
pass at an opportunity to second-guess the educational decisions of
182
school officials.
Not only is local control a longstanding tradition in the United
States, but it also serves important interests. For example, local

178.
See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
179.
See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding that the
State overstepped its bounds in enacting a statewide initiative which proscribed the use of
busing for purposes of racial integrations and upholding the power of local school districts
to challenge the plan giving them the power to independently assess the needs of its
community and act accordingly).
180.
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741. See, e.g., Dayton, 433 U.S. at 410 ("[O]ur cases have
...firmly recognized that local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition.").
181.
See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (stating
the court has always been "reluctan[t] to trench on the prerogatives of state and local
educational institutions"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43
(1973) (courts lack "specialized knowledge and expertise" in educational policy).
182.
See Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002). When asked to
interpret the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) to determine if the
federal law prohibits students from grading one another's papers, the Court acknowledged
that it will "hesitate before interpreting [a federal] statute to effect such a substantial
change in the balance of federalism, unless that is the manifest purpose of the legislation."
Id. at 432. The Court stated:
We doubt Congress meant to intervene in this drastic fashion with traditional
state functions. Under the Court of Appeals' interpretation of FERPA, the federal
power would exercise minute control over specific teaching methods and
instructional dynamics in classrooms throughout the country. The Congress is
not likely to have mandated this result, and we do not interpret the statute to
require it.

Id. at 435-36.
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control gives citizens an opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process. In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court stated, "local
control over the educational process affords citizens an opportunity to
participate in decision-making, permits the structuring of school
programs to fit local needs, and encourages 'experimentation,
18 3
innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence."'
However, the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Communities for Equity
weakens local control of school districts and discourages
84
experimentation and innovation.'
This approach comes at a time when schools are being enticed
with the promise of additional federal funds for developing single-sex
schools. A provision of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 provides
for the allocation of federal funds to local educational agencies for
"innovative assistance programs," including "[p]rograms to provide
same-gender schools and classrooms."'' 85 In support of this initiative,
the Department of Education has proposed a rule permitting singlesex classrooms that would require "substantially equal," but not
86
precisely identical, offerings.
However, if the Sixth Circuit approach is applied, many school
districts may find that the risk of costly litigation relating to minor
differences between all-boy and all-girl schools and classrooms would
likely outweigh the prospect of receiving whatever additional funding
the federal government could provide. It would be highly difficult for
a school to provide an "exceedingly persuasive" justification for minor
differences resulting from the administration of these types of single-

183.
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 742.
184.
See also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). Justice Brandeis,
in his dissent defending the Oklahoma Legislature which had passed a statute regulating
ice manufacturing, argued that, so long as its rules were not arbitrary, the Legislature
should be able to enact its own laws regardless of whether the Court thought them wise.
Id. at 285 & n.7 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Deciding the case during the Great Depression,
Brandeis went on to encourage "experimentation" and "trial and error" to fix the economic
and social situation of the United States at that time. Id. at 310. Brandeis articulated his
view of the role of the states in this process:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
Id. at 311.
185.
20 U.S.C.A. § 7215(a)(23) (West 2002).
186.
See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276 (proposed Mar. 9, 2004). The
regulation states that "a single-sex class for each sex, in the same subject, generally is not
required," and indeed that "different results for boys and girls, in some instances, may be
permissible." Id. at 11,279.
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sex programs. Thus, to place the burden of proving an exceedingly
persuasive justification for inconsequential
differences
(e.g.,
establishing school lunch menus) on school boards has the effect of
diminishing the board's local authority to establish a single-gender
school as an educational option for the district's students. Whether
single-sex classrooms and schools are the correct option or not for
public school districts, the school board should at least be given the
opportunity to carry out an innovative plan without facing the Sixth
Circuit's burden of justifying every minor detail in court.
IV. CONCLUSION
18 7
"Change is the only constant. Hanging on is the only sin."
This quote, taken from the district court's opinion in the Communities
for Equity case aptly characterizes the recent trend courts are taking
in their approach to addressing Title IX at the interscholastic level
with regard to the scheduling of nontraditional seasons. Yet the
combination of holdings in over almost ten years of litigation in the
Communities for Equity case has led to both an excessively high
standard of scrutiny and an overly broad applicability that ultimately
may have negative impacts on girls' sports by decreasing overall
female participation-the opposite of the very goal Title IX seeks to
ensure. While Michigan's sports scheduling may be an outlier among
states, its nontraditional seasons have created a system that seems to
address the demands on both the state's and individual communities'
limited resources (i.e., facilities, coaches, and officials) while
simultaneously providing for some of the highest statewide
participation levels for both male and female high school athletes in
the country. Although it may not meet the needs of a minority of
individual elite female athletes, overall this system appears to achieve
the MHSAA's legitimate goal of maximizing athletic opportunities for
all student athletes. The court in Communities for Equity, however,
fails to focus on the benefits this system provides student athletes
within the State of Michigan.
In light of the Sixth Circuit's most recent ruling denying an en
banc review, the MHSAA's only remaining option is to appeal once
again to the Supreme Court for a decision on the merits. However, if
the current holding remains-finding that the scheduling of
nontraditional sports seasons at the interscholastic level violates both

187.
Cmtys. for Equity vs. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 807
(W.D. 2001) (citing Denise McCluggage, U.S. race car driver, as quoted in WOMENSPORTS,
June 1977, at 18).
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Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause-it will create an excessively
high burden on local school districts to justify their programs and open
up a whole new battleground for discrimination litigation.
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POSTSCRIPT

On April 2, 2007, as this note went to press, the United State
Supreme Court denied the MHSAA's second appeal of Communities
for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Association,1 8 8 thus
effectuating the MHSAA's proposal to change sports seasons for the
following school year. 8 9 Starting with the 2007-2008 school year, six
sports-most notably girls' basketball and volleyball-will switch
seasons, a change that will affect roughly 70,000 female student
athletes.1 90 While the Supreme Court's denial finally ends the longrunning legal battle between Communities for Equity and the
MHSAA, it remains to be seen whether the effect of the decision on
high schools' limited facilities, scheduling logistics, and coaching will
impact girls' sports (especially basketball) more adversely than boys'
sports or lead to even more litigation.' 9 ' Whatever may happen in the
future, however, it is now certain that the 2007-2008 Michigan high
school sports season will be a season of change.
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